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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tiffany Dee Razon appeals from the district court's orders revoking
probation following periods of probation in two separate criminal cases.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2006, Razon was charged in Twin Falls County District Court case CR06-2274 with possession of methamphetamine and/or amphetamine with intent
to deliver and forgery.

(R., pp.61-63.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Razon

pied guilty to an amended charge of possession of methamphetamine and/or
amphetamine and the state dismissed the forgery charge.

(R., p.124.)

The

district court sentenced Razon to an underlying unified six-year term with two
years fixed, and placed on in the retained jurisdiction ("rider") program.

(R.,

pp.147-152.) After completion of her rider, the district court placed Razon on
probation for three years. (R., pp.163-167, 174-178.) In December of 2007, the
district court ordered Razon to serve up to 30 days of jail for admittedly using
methamphetamine several times.

(R., p.187.)

In February of 2009, the state

alleged Razon violated her probation by (1) failing to report to her probation
officer, (2) absconding from supervision, (3) being discharged from counseling,
(4) failing to report for substance abuse testing, (5) changing residences without
her probation officer's permission, (6) failing to complete community service
hours, (7) failing to wear an ankle monitor, and (8) possessing or consuming a
controlled substance. (R., pp.189-197.) Prior to adjudication on the probation
violation

allegations,

the

state

charged

1

Razon

with

possession

of

methamphetamine in a separate case (CR 09-1765), which became the basis of
two additional probation violation allegations in her first case. (R., pp.216-217,
393-395.)
On April 20, 2009, Razon entered a guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in the second case (CR 09-1765), and
the two cases were ordered consolidated for future hearings before Judge
Bevan. (R., pp.400-411.) The next day, Razon admitted the first eight probation
violation allegations in her first case, and the state dismissed the two additional
allegations. (R., p.230.) The district court ordered Razon to be placed in the
rider program a second time.

(R., pp.224-230.)

In regard to Razon's second

case, the court sentenced her to six years with three years fixed, and also
ordered her to complete the rider program, concurrent with her first case. (R.,
pp.413-426.)

At the end of Razon's concurrent riders, the district court

suspended her sentences and placed her on probation for three years
(concurrent) in each case. (R., pp.233-238, 430-435, 444-449.)
In June of 2011, the state filed two sets of probation violation allegations
against Razon in both cases.

(R., pp.244-250, 289-291, 452-458, 492-496.)

One month later, Razon admitted violating her probations by (1) using
methamphetamine between April 9, 2011 and May 31, 2011, 1 (2) being
discharged from substance abuse treatment, and (3) using methamphetamine on
1

Relative to this probation violation allegation, the record reflects that Razon
pied guilty on October 17, 2011, to felony possession of a controlled substance her third such conviction - and that she waived an appeal in that case because
"the court followed the state's recommendation identically" by sentencing her to
seven years with three years fixed, concurrent with the other two cases.
(12/19/11 Tr., p.4, L.10 - p.5, L.8; p.23, Ls.12-19.)

2

June 19, 2011. (R., pp.319, 524.) The state dismissed the remaining probation
violation allegations. (Id.) On December 19, 2011, the district court ordered the
probation in each case revoked and "reimposed" the original sentences without
modification.

(R., pp.329-333, 535-539.)

Razon timely appealed from the

revocation of probation in both cases (R., pp.336-351, 542-544), which appeals
have been consolidated by order of this Court (R., pp.350-351, 555-556).

3

ISSUES
Razon states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Razon due process
and equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment
with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua
sponte reduce the length of Ms. Razon's sentences upon
revoking probation?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Razon failed to establish the Idaho Supreme Court violated her due
process and equal protection rights by denying her motion to augment the
appellate record with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Razon failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by not,
reducing her sentences sua sponte?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Razon Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Her Due
Process And Equal Protection Rights By Denying Her Motion To Augment The
Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Razon filed a motion to augment

the record with seven as-yet unprepared transcripts consisting of two rider review
hearings, two entry of plea hearings, the sentencing hearing, one evidentiary
hearing, and one admit/deny hearing. ("Motion To Augment And To Suspend
The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof." filed June 25, 2012
(hereinafter "Motion").) After the state filed an objection in part to the Motion
(6/26/12 "Objection In Part To 'Motion to Augment [etc.]'"), the Idaho Supreme
Court denied Razon's Motion to augment the record with regard to all but one of
her requests. ("Order," filed 7/11/12.)
Razon now contends that, by denying her motion to augment the appellate
record with the remaining requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has
violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has
effectively denied her effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
Brief, pp.5-17.)

(Appellant's

Razon has failed to establish a violation of her constitutional

rights, however, because she has failed to show that the requested transcripts
are even relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over
which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Razon Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The
Requested Augmentation
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is

sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477

(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles,
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however,
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper,
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not su'fficient,
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced her
ability to pursue the appeal.

State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d

229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893

6

(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1 st Cir. 2002). To
show prejudice, Razon "must present something more than gross speculation
that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598,
605 (6 th Cir. 2002). Razon has failed to carry this burden.
Razon's appeal is timely only from the district court's December 19, 2011
orders revoking probation.

(See R., pp.330-333, 336-338, 536-539, 542-544.)

Because Razon's appeal is timely only from the district court's orders revoking
probation and ordering her underlying sentences executed, those are the only
issues over which the appellate court has jurisdiction. See,~. State v. Payan,
128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996) (a timely filed notice of
appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891,
665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) (same). Nevertheless, Razon sought to augment
the appellate record with the following transcripts: ( 1) Transcript of the entry of
plea hearing held on July 24, 2006; (2) Transcript of the sentencing hearing held
on September 18, 2006; (3) Transcript of the rider review hearing held on March
7, 2007; (4) Transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on April 21, 2009; (5)
Transcript of the rider review hearing held on October 14, 2009; (6) Transcript of
the admit/deny probation violation hearing held on July 26, 2011; and (7)
Transcript of the entry of plea hearing held on April 20, 2009. (Motion, pp.1-2.)
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Razon's request to augment the appellate
record with the sixth requested item (transcript of the 7/26/11 admit/deny
probation violation hearing), and denied Razon's remaining augmentation
requests. {Order, 7-11-12.)

7

On appeal, Razon argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due
process and equal protection by denying her motion to augment the appellate
record with the remaining as-yet unprepared transcripts (i.e., items 1 through 5,
7). However, she has failed to adequately explain, much less demonstrate, how
the requested transcripts of hearings relate to the only issues on appeal - the
district court's orders revoking probation and ordering her underlying sentences
executed.
Razon contends "the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of
whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion." (Appellant's Brief,
p.5.)

Despite Razon's argument, because the as-yet unprepared transcripts

were never presented to the district court in relation to the consolidated probation
revocation hearing at issue in this case, they were never part of the record before
the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993)
(in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is
"limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence
that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77,
80, 896 P .2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain
new allegations of fact and consider new evidence.").
Razon responds that the requested transcripts are relevant because the
district court was entitled to "rely upon the information it already knows from
presiding over the prior hearings when it made its sentencing determinations."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, Razon does not explain where the record
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gives any indication that the court in fact relied on its memory of specific aspects
of those proceedings in revoking her probations and ordering her sentences
executed. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-15.) Nor does Razon adequately explain
how transcripts of the prior hearings, held between two and five years previously,
are necessary to decide the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on
this appeal. Indeed, there is no evidence that the district court had the as-yet
unprepared transcripts when it revoked Razon's probation in December 2011, or
that it relied upon anything said at the prior hearings as a basis for its decision to
finally revoke Razon's probation and order her sentences executed.

Razon's

suggestion that the district court may have relied on its own recollection of the
prior proceedings in deciding whether to revoke her probation (Appellant's Brief,
p.12 ("the court may rely upon the information it already knows .... ") is pure
speculation and fails to show that the requested transcripts are necessary to
complete a record adequate for appellate review under the facts of this case.
Razon further contends, citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218
P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that "[t]he requested transcripts are relevant because
Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following sentencing when
determining whether the court made appropriate sentencing determinations."
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

The state recognizes the Idaho Court of Appeals'

statement in Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 8, that appellate "review
[of] a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation" is
based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."

9

Contrary to Razon's assertions, however, Hanington does not stand for the
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was
presented at prior hearings and that the district court relied on such evidence in
reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date
probation was finally revoked. 2

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194

(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all
of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the
2

In the recently decided (non-final, yet to be released for publication) decision
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2782599
*3 (Idaho App. 2012), relied upon here as instructive, the Court explained:
Morgan asserts that this Court's decision in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), requires a
review of the entire record of proceedings in the trial court up to and
including the revocation of probation. Morgan reads Hanington too
broadly. As stated in Hanington, in reviewing the propriety of a
probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily confine ourselves to only
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the
revocation of probation. Id. at 28, 218 P.3d at 8. However, that
does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation.
Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are
properly made part of the record on appeal.
10

State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review.").
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the
appellate record of transcripts of sentencing, rider review, and probation violation
hearings to fully review a probation revocation hearing, Razon has failed to show
that any such circumstances apply here. There is nothing provided by Razon
that would indicate that what happened at the prior hearings, held between two
and five years before the issuance of the decision that is at issue on appeal, was
considered or played any role in the district court's decision to revoke Razon's
probations and order her sentences executed. Accordingly, Razon has failed to
show such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this
appeal.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Razon claims she is
only required to make a "colorable argument" that she "needs items to create a
complete a record on appeal" before the burden transfers to the state "to prove
that the· requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's Brief,
p.10.)

She also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the

constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must
provide him (and all indigent defendants) "with an appellate record unless the
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's
Brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("[T]he only way a court can constitutionally preclude an
indigent defendant from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the
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transcript is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.").) No reading of Mayer
supports these legal arguments.
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.

kl at

190. The appellate court denied his request for

a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government
expense only for felonies.

kl at

191-193. The issue was not whether Mayer was

entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim
transcript of his trial.

kl

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper,
372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record

where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way."

kl

at 195.

"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on
those grounds."

kl

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

12

kl at

194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. lsL_ at 194-95. See also
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may
take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Here

the

only

proceeding

challengeable

on

appeal

is

Razon's

consolidated probation violation hearing. The record related to the district court's
decision is already complete because all of the evidence considered by the
district court for that hearing is before the appellate court. It is Razon's appellate
burden to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an
adequate appellate record to review the orders revoking her probations and
executing her sentences. The augmentation she sought, however, was of never
before prepared transcripts of hearings held two to five years before the district
court rendered the decisions at issue in this case. Nothing in the record even
suggests that the requested transcripts (or anything contained therein) were
before the district court in relation to probation violation hearing. Because Razon
failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate
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review, and Razon has failed to establish a violation of her due process rights. 3
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478.
Razon has also failed to establish that denial of her request to augment
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied her equal protection.
Razon cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11 (citing, ~ .
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Razon's request
for transcripts solely because she is indigent. In fact, Razon's motion would have
properly been denied even if she had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested.

I.A.R. 30.

Razon's

motion to augment failed because she failed to meet this minimal burden,
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even
helpful in addressing appellate issues.

The Idaho Supreme Court's order

properly denied the motion to augment because Razon failed to make a showing
that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the
record as requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment
3

As a component of his due process claim, Razon argues that the denial of her
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived her of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.)
Because Razon has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary,
or even relevant, for appellate review of the district court's orders revoking her
probations and executing her sentences, there is no possibility that the denial of
the motion to augment has deprived Razon of effective assistance of counsel on
this appeal.
14

would have been granted had Razon been paying for the requested transcripts;
the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent.
Razon has failed to show that the denial of her motion to augment was in
any way influenced or decided by her indigence, nor has she demonstrated that
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the
record amply demonstrates that Razon's motion to augment with the requested
transcripts was properly denied because she failed to show that the transcripts
were necessary for adequate review of the district court's orders revoking her
probations and executing her sentences. Because Razon has failed to show her
due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by
the denial of her motion to augment, she has failed to show any basis for relief.

11.
Razon Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce Her Sentences Pursuant To Rule 35

A

Introduction
Razon asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed,

sua sponte, to reduce her sentences pursuant to Rule 35 upon revoking

probation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.17-20.)

The record, however, supports the

district court's decision to revoke probation and order the underlying sentences of
six years with two years fixed in her 2006 case, and six years with three years
fixed in her 2009 case, executed without reduction.

15

B.

Standard Of Review
Upon revoking Razon's probations, the district court had the authority,

pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying
sentences imposed upon her convictions for possession of a controlled
substance. I.C.R. 35; State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179 P.3d 360, 363
(Ct. App. 2008). The decision of whether to do so was committed to the district
court's discretion and, as such, Razon bears the burden on appeal of
establishing that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte
reducing her sentences. lg.,_

C.

Razon Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
When It Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce Her Sentences Pursuant To Rule
35
Razon asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed,

sua sponte, to reduce her sentences pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 because
of numerous mitigating factors, including her progress toward completed her
GED, family support, difficult childhood, her mental health, methamphetamine
addiction, and her positive performances in the rider program. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.17-20.) Razon has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
From the outset of Razon's first case (CR 06-2274), she engaged in a
pattern of non-compliance with court and probationary orders that permeates her
two cases. As a special condition of being initially released on bond, she was
ordered to abide by the requirements of the Court Compliance Program, but
failed to appear at her required scheduled appointments with the Court
Compliance Office, resulting in the court ordering her back into custody.

16

(R.,

pp.64-68, 94-99.) Following her first rider, Razon violated the conditions of her
probation by:

(1) failing to report to her probation officer, (2) absconding from

supervision, (3) being discharged from counseling, (4) failing to report for
substance abuse testing, (5) changing residences without her probation officer's
permission, (6) failing to complete community service hours, (7) failing to wear an
ankle monitor, and (8) possessing or consuming a controlled substance.

(R.,

pp.189-197.) In 2009, and while still on probation in her first case, Razon pied
guilty to a second charge of felony possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine).

(R., pp.216-217, 393-395, 400-410.)

In the probation

violation disposition in Razon's first case, and as her initial sentence in her
second case, the court gave her the opportunity to complete a second rider,
which resulted in her being placed on probation a second time. (R., pp.233-238,
430-435, 444-449.)

Razon not only violated the conditions of that second

probation, she did so by committing another felony offense of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine).

(R., pp.319, 524; 12/19/11 Tr., p.4,

L.10 - p.5, L.8; p.23, Ls.12-19; see fn. 1, supra.) In short, Razon was given the
opportunity, following two riders, to succeed on probation, and completely failed
to do so.
The district court acknowledged Razon's strong family support, mental
health issues, and ongoing treatment possibilities, but reluctantly concluded that
it had done all it could to allow Razon the opportunity to show she could be
rehabilitated while on probation, explaining:
We've been down this road five years now and tried two riders
worth of rehab. We've tried community settings. . . . We tried
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community support, family support groups, and ACTS program, AC-T-S program. And I think the frustration that the court sees ... is
that no matter what we try to do to encourage, with somewhat of a
hammer over your head, your return to sobriety and this good life
that you have a potential for, nothing seems to work in the
community. Nothing seems to be enough of a threat, if you will, to
deal with the throes of the addiction, which in your case is obviously
extreme and one that has led you to this point. You've had some
difficulties in your past. I acknowledge those things that have led
you here .
. . . Let me quote the words from the discharge summary at
Positive Connections back in June of his year: The use of any
substance may exacerbate Tiffany's mental health symptoms or
status. It's recommended she attend residential treatment in a
controlled environment.
Perhaps treatment in a controlled
environment will help this client cease her use of illicit drugs.
That report is telling in the fact that it talks about your coming
to one group in an IOP program under the influence of meth back in
May of this year and then ongoing difficulties to the point that you
were discharged there.
I recognize that TARC has some options for you, and Jubilee
House offered you a place to stay; but it just seems like we're
opening the same door with the same result, time after time, in your
case, Ma'am.
(12/19/11 Tr., p.19, L9-p.21, L.4.)
In summarizing its decision to impose Razon's original sentences, the
court explained, "I don't do that simply to punish you. I think, though, there is a
component of that, that the good order of society, certainly after this much time
and this many tries, has to say, you know, enough is enough, and we have to
pay the fiddler for what we've done wrong over his five-year period of ongoing
criminality." (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.) Finally, the district court acknowledged
it had authority under Rule 35 to reduce the sentences, but declined to do so in
its discretion. (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, L.24 - p.23, L.1.)
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The district court's decision not to further reduce Razon's sentences upon
revoking her probations was appropriate in light of her continuous failure to abide
by the terms and conditions of probation.

In review of the entire record, the

district court's decision to revoke Razon's probations was reasonable in light of
the nature of her underlying offenses, her criminal history, and an unwillingness
to abide by the conditions of probation. Considering all those factors, Razon was
not entitled to have the district court sua sponte reduce her sentences. Given
any reasonable view of the facts, Razon has failed to establish an abuse of
sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking probation and executing her original sentences.
DATED this 30th day of November, 2012.

C. McKINNEY
ty Attorney Genera
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